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Raising the Bar: Establishing an Effective Remedy
against Ineffective Counsel
I. INTRODUCTION
Allen Aldrich made two mistakes. First, while intoxicated, he
drove his pickup truck through a crosswalk and slammed into a
disabled woman in a wheelchair. 1 She died in the hospital shortly
thereafter. 2 Second, Aldrich hired a terrible attorney.
Not only did Aldrich’s attorney fail to convey a plea bargain
under the mistaken belief that it was unethical to discuss the plea
bargain with his client, 3 but he also repeatedly recognized the need
for defense experts yet failed to timely designate a single one. 4 What
is more, Aldrich’s counsel lacked a basic understanding of simple
discovery procedures. 5 For example, despite repeated correction
from both the prosecutor and the court, he persisted in his assertion
that he did not have to do any investigation, perform any witness
interviews, or make any attempt to obtain discovery under the
misguided belief that that was all the State’s responsibility. 6
But things got much worse once the trial began. Aldrich’s
counsel did not know how to question witnesses. 7 He did not
understand the rules of evidence. 8 And the defense theories that he
presented were strange and offensive. 9 For instance, the bulk of
1. Aldrich v. State, 296 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Tex. App. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 243 (“Aldrich argues that trial counsel failed to adequately convey the
twenty-year plea bargain to him. The record before us contains defense counsel’s letter
rejecting the plea bargain, and it supports Aldrich’s position. The letter specifically sets forth
defense counsel’s belief that it would be unethical and would constitute malpractice for him to
even discuss the proposed plea bargain with Aldrich.”).
4. Id. at 245.
5. Id. at 233.
6. Id. at 245 (“Instead, even after receiving the benefit of multiple continuances,
defense counsel undertook little or no investigation—until just a few weeks before the July 25,
2005 trial setting—based on the unreasonable decision that Kyles required the State to
perform an investigation for him . . . .”).
7. Id. at 251 (“The record reflects that defense counsel had great difficulty
questioning witnesses.”).
8. Among other problems, Aldrich’s counsel repeatedly asked to have jurors removed
from the courtroom to make simple objections to leading questions. Id. at 252.
9. Id. at 247.
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defense counsel’s cross-examination consisted of eliciting testimony
that the victim’s death was not an accident caused by a drunk driver,
but was an assisted suicide attempt—that the victim was trying to kill
herself or that the victim’s husband had intentionally pushed his wife
into the path of the speeding car. 10
Not surprisingly, on appeal the court found Allen Aldrich’s
counsel constitutionally ineffective and Aldrich received a new trial. 11
But what is surprising is that nothing happened to Aldrich’s
counsel. 12 There was no disciplinary hearing, no formal reprimand,
nor any consequence for the defense attorney’s extremely deficient
and “bizarre” performance. 13 In fact, the deficient attorney was never

10. Id. at 256. One of the bizarre cross examinations of a police officer went as follows:
Q. The thing that she was riding in had four wheels?
A. Yes, sir, I believe it would have.
Q. She was not afoot. She was riding and it was propelled by an electric motor, was
it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is that—do you know that that’s the definition of a motor vehicle?
A. A motor vehicle—
....
Q. Well, let me ask you this. Did you believe in your initial investigation that the—
Mr. Hudson and Mrs. Hudson had made a left turn and started walking across the
crosswalk, that they would have seen the oncoming—this oncoming traffic, the one
that before and during and after my client was—that ultimately hit her, that they
deliberately made a left-hand turn to walk across the place where they knew that
these cars were going to come? Did you realize that the night you were out there?
A. Do I believe they deliberately stepped in front of your client?
Q. That’s for the jury to decide. I’m just asking you, did it—in your investigation as
the senior officer out there, people with long debilitating injuries, sometimes they
commit suicide, don’t they?
A. In Texas, the people in the crosswalk have the right-of-way.
Q. Well, that’s the wrong law, but if that’s what you believe, you’re incorrect.
....
Q. All right. Now, did you, taking in the scene, the lighting, the ability to see a
person that was coming as the Hudsons were, to see oncoming traffic, the
realization that they walked right in front of this oncoming car, did you make sure
and say, Hey, be sure to question Mr. Hudson about why he did such a thing? Did
you mention, suggest, gosh, this guy had the opportunity, looks like he just walked
her out there in front of the cars. Did anything like that happen?
Id. at 247–48.
11. Id. at 260.
12. Find a Lawyer: Paul W. Leech, ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Find_A_Lawyer&template=/Customsource/MemberDirectory/
MemberDirectoryDetail.cfm&ContactID=224590 (last visited Dec. 25, 2014).
13. See Aldrich, 296 S.W.3d 225; Find a Lawyer: Paul W. Leech, supra note 12.
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even named in the appellate court opinion. 14 The attorney continued
to practice and continued to give incompetent representation in
other cases. 15
This scenario is not uncommon. 16 Rarely, if ever, are defense
attorneys reprimanded after being found constitutionally deficient. 17
Rarely, if ever, are defense attorneys named by the court that finds
the counsel ineffective. 18 As a result, the practice of law sets its
“sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity.” 19 And when
mediocrity becomes the “prevailing standard of practice,” 20 society
loses faith in the system itself. So what can be done?
This Comment explores this question. Part II discusses the
standard of ineffectiveness, as established by Strickland, and how the
Supreme Court inadvertently created the framework for the current
14. See Aldrich, 296 S.W.3d 225. The trial attorney’s name, Paul Leech, was only
discovered after searching the Denton County Court Records. DENTON COUNTY RECORDS
INQUIRY, http://justice1.dentoncounty.com/PublicAccessDC/ (follow “District Clerk
Criminal Case Records” hyperlink under “Case Records”; then search by defendant for last
name “Aldrich” and first name “Allen”; then follow “F-2004-1128-E” hyperlink under “Case
Number”) (last visited Jan. 23, 2016).
15. In 2007, Paul W. Leech was publicly reprimanded for violating Rule 1.01
(competence) of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct for failing to attend a hearing while
also failing to notify his client of the hearing, which resulted in a default judgment against his
client. Disciplinary Actions, 70 TEX. B.J. 726, 730 (2007).
16. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that defense
counsel slept through major portions of the trial, but no disciplinary hearings or claims were
brought against the attorney for seventeen years). By the time the Fifth Circuit found counsel
ineffective, seventeen years after the original trial, counsel was already deceased. But in that
seventeen-year period, there is no record of any disciplinary hearings or claims against that
attorney. It was also not the first time counsel had fallen asleep during a trial. See David R.
Dow, The State, the Death Penalty and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 693–95 (1996). For
a discussion of cases of ineffective assistance of counsel post Wiggins v. Smith, see Teresa L.
Norris, Summaries of Published Successful Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Post-Wiggins
v. Smith, CAP. DEF. NETWORK (Jul. 26, 2013), https://www.capdefnet.org/
hat/uploadedFiles/Public/Helpful_Cases/Ineffective_Assistance_of_Counsel/IAC%20PostWi
ggins%2072613.pdf.
17. See Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Op. 13-04 para. 16 (Sept. 30, 2013) (Tenney,
dissenting) (“The Utah Bar Journal publishes a monthly summary of all attorneys who have
been professionally disciplined. I have reviewed those summaries for the past five years and
cannot find a single instance in which a criminal defense lawyer was sanctioned because a court
had concluded that he was ineffective under the Sixth Amendment.”).
18. Id. para. 15.
19. See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58
MD. L. REV. 1433, 1472 (1999) (quoting Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to Be
Realized, CHAMPION, Mar. 1998, at 65).
20. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 135 (2004).
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lack of any remedy against ineffective counsel. Part III develops the
issues that Strickland raised and discusses the lack of any real or
substantive repercussions against a constitutionally deficient attorney,
explores the reasons why that is, and discusses why a remedy beyond
that of a new trial is important. Part III also discusses why the
available “remedies”—the fear of malpractice claims or the fear of
harming professional reputation—are unrealistic, difficult to prove,
and unlikely to affect an attorney’s performance. Part IV then
examines the beginning of the solution and the central thesis—that a
violation of Strickland is a violation of the Model Rules. To arrive at
this conclusion, this Comment first explores the link between a
defendant’s right to effective assistance and a lawyer’s duty under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Specifically, it looks at how
courts have used the Model Rules to define the Strickland standard
itself. As a result of that link, Part V suggests a solution—make it a
mandatory requirement to report an attorney to the bar when a
court finds that counsel has been constitutionally deficient. Part
VI concludes.
II. STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON—THE BEGINNING OF
THE PROBLEM
To understand how ineffective assistance of counsel is applied
today and why ineffective attorneys face no real repercussions, it is
first necessary to understand the seminal case that defined the rule
for determining ineffective assistance—Strickland v. Washington. In
Strickland, David Leroy Washington planned and committed three
groups of gruesome crimes including three brutal stabbings,
murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders,
attempted extortion, and theft. 21 But against the advice of his court
appointed attorney, William Tunkey, 22 Washington confessed to the
first two murders, waived his right to a jury trial, and pleaded guilty
to all charges. 23 As a result, Tunkey “experienced a sense of
hopelessness.” 24 After Washington pleaded guilty, his counsel further
advised him to invoke his right under Florida law to an advisory jury

21. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671–72 (1984).
22. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S.
668 (1984).
23. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672.
24. Id.

1118

RICKS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

1115

3/12/2016 5:22 PM

Raising the Bar

at his capital sentencing hearing. 25 But again, Washington rejected
the advice and waived the right. 26
All Tunkey did to prepare for the sentencing hearing was to
speak a single time with Washington’s mother and wife on the
telephone after making one unsuccessful effort to meet with them. 27
But he did not otherwise seek out character witnesses, request a
psychiatric examination, or look for further evidence concerning
Washington’s character or emotional state. 28 The judge sentenced
Washington to death on each of the three counts of murder along
with prison terms for the other crimes. 29
On appeal and in collateral proceedings Washington challenged
his counsel’s assistance in several respects. 30 He asserted various
claims of ineffective assistance and “submitted 14 affidavits from
friends, neighbors, and relatives, stating that they would have
testified if asked to do so.” 31 He also submitted a psychiatric report
and a psychological report, both of which stated that Washington
was “chronically frustrated and depressed because of his economic
dilemma” when the crimes were committed. 32
The Supreme Court denied Washington relief. In doing this, the
Court also established the now well-recognized two-part test for
determining whether an attorney was so ineffective and incompetent
as to have violated a defendant’s constitutional rights. First, the
defendant must have shown that his “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 33 Second, the Court

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 672–73. One scholar has even suggested that “counsel did virtually
nothing with respect to the sentencing hearing.” William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s
Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 91, 115 (1995).
28. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
29. Id. at 675.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 675–76.
33. Id. at 688. The Court also stated that in determining the objective standard of
reasonableness, the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Id. at 686. Further, the Court
stated that this would require a showing “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
at 687.
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stated that the “defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” 34 Applying this standard, the Court held
that Tunkey’s strategy choices were within the range of
professionally reasonable judgments and the choice not to seek more
character evidence was reasonable. 35 The Court went on to say that
there was no reasonable probability that the evidence the defendant
said his trial counsel should have offered would have altered the
outcome of the trial and sentencing hearing. 36
Washington was executed July 13, 1984, two months after
the decision. 37
William Tunkey continued to practice. 38 Tunkey’s name was
never even mentioned in the Supreme Court decision. 39 As far as the
author can tell, no malpractice claims or formal complaints against
Tunkey were ever filed. 40 Thus began the days of Strickland. And its
critics. 41 But while many have criticized the standard itself in that it
34. Id. at 687. In other words, the defendant had to show that his “counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id.
35. Id. at 699.
36. Id. at 699–700.
37. Killer Apologizes Before His Execution, TELEGRAPH, July 13, 1984, at 21,
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2209&dat=19840713&id=ZqcrAAAAIBAJ&sjid=
9vwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=6811,2282489.
38. William R. Tunkey, ROBBINS TUNKEY ROSS ANSEL RABEN & WAXMAN P.A. (June
19, 2014), http://www.crimlawfirm.com/employee/william-r-tunkey/.
39. Compare Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, with Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243,
1247 (5th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
40. William R Tunkey, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/wps/portal/flbar/home/
attysearch/mprofile/!ut/p/a1/jc_LDoIwEAXQT-pthRaWo6mkRazxgdCNYUWaKLowfr_
42LioOrtJzs3cYZ41zA_dLfTdNZyH7vjYvTxACM3dBrawxEHlOl3ZqgSEHEE7girnxJMMN
ktoDlOr2qgtF7RM_8sjMoRf-T3zn8RJNQO5BXKtp0AxeYNIRTj-HTx_eJ2Il7ycdg2C6e8_
WXgh/dl5/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSE h/?mid=125153 (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
41. See, e.g., Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective
Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 441 (2004) (“If there is a problem with the Strickland
analysis, it is that the test fails to assure even a minimal level of competence or effectiveness.”);
Jimmy E. Tinsley, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, in 5 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 267 § 2
(1975) (“One judge, in harshly criticizing the standard, has suggested various reasons for the
reluctance of appellate courts to adopt a more realistic standard of effectiveness. Among these
reasons are the belief that if truly effective assistance were required, half the cases on appeal
would require reversal, there would not be enough competent lawyers to provide effective
assistance, and the court system would grind to a halt.”); Kelly Green, “There’s Less in This
Than Meets the Eye”: Why Wiggins Doesn’t Fix Strickland and What the Court Should Do
Instead, 29 VT. L. REV. 647, 647 (2005) (“Criticism of Strickland appeared as soon as the ink
of the opinion dried and continues today . . . .”); Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial Interference
with Effective Assistance of Counsel, 31 PACE L. REV. 560, 560 (2011) (“However, the standard
for ‘effective assistance’ in defending a client is complex and controversial.”).
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creates an almost impossible hurdle for defendants to overcome, few
have addressed the hidden issue—one Strickland also failed to
address—what happens to an attorney who is found
constitutionally ineffective. 42
III. INEFFECTIVE ATTORNEYS FACE NO REAL REPERCUSSIONS
As the system stands, a criminal defendant has no real remedy
against an attorney who has violated his Sixth Amendment right. As
one Assistant Attorney General in Utah stated, “If a defendant
demonstrates that his trial counsel was ineffective, the defendant
does not receive anything from the lawyer as a remedy. Rather, what
the defendant receives is a reversal of his criminal conviction or
sentence.” 43 Certainly, no reasonable attorney would want to be
found constitutionally ineffective, especially after having put in the
substantial amount of time, effort, and resources required to defend
a client. But the increasing number of successful ineffective assistance
claims demonstrates that whatever reasons attorneys currently may
have to not be found ineffective are not enough to have any
actual impact. 44
This Part begins by establishing that there is no real remedy
against the ineffective attorney beyond that of a new trial. Further, it
will explore how the available “remedies” of malpractice claims,
harm to professional reputation, and court sanctions are not realistic
and are difficult to prove. 45 Next, this Part will discuss the increase in
ineffective assistance claims, the increase in their success, and possible
explanations for that increase. Following that discussion, it will then
explore why a remedy is needed as well as the many problems that
arise because of the lack of a remedy. These problems include an
42. Few scholars have addressed the issue or repercussions against the attorney.
However, some scholars have at least mentioned it in passing. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the
Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1,
9–10 (1995) (“The lawyer may experience some degree of humiliation, assuming peers read
the court decision reversing the defendant’s conviction. But that is it.”); see also Paul J. Kelly,
Jr., Are We Prepared to Offer Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1093
(2001) (citing several examples where counsel “failed to prepare any strategy, arguments were
incoherent and that the lawyers failed to attend hearings and call witnesses” and stating that
“[t]o the extent that this is true, what is startling is that convictions and death sentences were
all affirmed and no one said or did a thing about the lawyers involved”).
43. Utah State Bar, supra note 17, para. 10 (emphasis added).
44. See infra Section III.B.
45. See infra Section III.C.
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increase in frivolous claims, a decrease in professional norms due to
attorneys falling on their sword, and a rise in ineffective attorneys
who continue to practice. Finally, this Part will explore possible
reasons for a lack of any real repercussion from the state bar.
A. No Real Remedy Exists
Today, there are no real repercussions or remedies against the
constitutionally ineffective attorney. As one scholar has noted:
Assuming the criminal defendant succeeds in securing a new trial,
having shown that the lawyer was so negligent that even
Strickland’s presumptions could not whitewash the incompetence,
how do the courts deal with the lawyer? Is malpractice presumed?
Is the lawyer automatically subject to some disciplinary action? Is
the attorney required to undergo continuing peer review and
supervision? Is the lawyer barred from handling criminal cases or
required to attend classes? Anything? No. 46

To be sure, some have disagreed and claimed that there are
repercussions and remedies against the ineffective attorney. These socalled “repercussions” come in three forms: harm to the attorney’s
professional reputation, legal malpractice claims, and court sanctions.
But as discussed below, none of these “repercussions” are effective
or realistic.
The first claimed “repercussion” is that the attorney who is
declared constitutionally ineffective may face humiliation and his
professional reputation may be harmed. 47 That “harm” to the
attorney’s reputation may take several forms including losing
credibility in front of the judge who finds them ineffective or
possibly losing credibility in front of that judge’s colleagues. On the
other hand, it may take the form of embarrassment in the presence
of other attorneys who may be aware of the court’s finding of
ineffectiveness. As a result, the ineffective attorney may lose clients,
social standing, and prestige. Thus it is claimed that these
professional consequences would deter an attorney from giving substandard legal assistance to a criminal defendant.

46. Koniak, supra note 42, at 9.
47. Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel’s Ethical
Duty to the Capital Defendant, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1191 (2003) (stating that when
defense counsel is found ineffective he will “suffer the ignominy and shame that follows”).
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However, the idea that losing an ineffective assistance claim
harms the attorney’s reputation is implausible. It rests on the
assumption that peers will read the court decision, 48 but it also
assumes that anyone reading the decision could identify the defense
lawyer who had been accused of being ineffective. Yet, it is not the
practice of appellate courts to publicly identify defense lawyers in
written decisions. 49 In fact, one survey of Tenth Circuit opinions over
a five-year period showed that hundreds of opinions were issued in
criminal cases, but only between three and five of the opinions a year
ever named the trial lawyer as part of an ineffective assistance claim. 50
Another claimed “repercussion” is the possibility of the
defendant filing a malpractice claim against his counsel. The fear of a
malpractice suit would arguably deter a defense attorney from
unprofessionally representing a client. But while fear of malpractice
may have some minimal impact on an attorney’s behavior, it is not a
realistic remedy. Eighty percent of defendants in criminal cases do
not have funds to hire a defense attorney. 51 Thus it is idealistic to
assume that after years of trial and appeals a defendant would have
the funds or even be willing to hire a civil attorney, pay court fees,
attorney fees, and risk losing simply to file a malpractice claim. But
even if a civil attorney takes a malpractice claim on a contingency
fee, 52 winning is unrealistic. Many states have granted public
defenders qualified immunity from suit for acts or omissions made in
the course of “executing their official duties” regardless of whether
the attorney had been found ineffective. 53
48. Koniak, supra note 42, at 9–10.
49. Ethics Advisory Opinion 13-04, supra note 17, paras. 14–15.
50. Id. para. 14.
51. Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, The Right to Counsel: Badly Battered at 50, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/the-right-tocounsel-badly-battered-at-50.html (finding that “at least 80 percent of state criminal
defendants cannot afford to pay for lawyers and have to depend on court-appointed counsel”).
52. One website notes that when an attorney charges a contingency fee for legal
malpractice claims, it is usually between forty and fifty percent. This is much higher than other
types of negligence cases because of the difficulty in proving malpractice. Suing Your Lawyer,
LAWYERS.COM, http://legal-malpractice.lawyers.com/suing-your-lawyer.html (last visited Jan.
23, 2016).
53. Harold H. Chen, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective Response to
the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE L.J. 783, 784, 806 (1996) (stating that several states
“shield indigent-defense attorneys from malpractice suits brought by their indigent clients”);
see also Mooney v. Frazier, 693 S.E.2d 333, 345 (W. Va. 2010) (“[A]n attorney appointed by a
federal court to represent a criminal defendant, in a federal criminal prosecution in West
Virginia, has absolute immunity from purely state law claims of legal malpractice that derive
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A further difficulty to any civil malpractice suit as a result of a
criminal case is that the majority of courts also require proof of
“actual innocence.” 54 Some states have even gone far enough to state
that a legal malpractice claim cannot succeed unless “the person’s
conviction has been reversed, whether on appeal or through postconviction relief, or the person otherwise has been exonerated.” 55
Thus, even if an attorney has been declared constitutionally deficient,
if the conviction holds, the defendant has no real remedy for a
deficient attorney.
One last possible “remedy” would be the court imposing
sanctions on the ineffective attorney. 56 When a judge receives
information that indicates a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the rules, he may take “appropriate action”
against that attorney. 57 Many courts’ local rules are similar. 58 As a
result, courts enjoy broad discretion when it comes to determining
who may practice before them as well as regulating the conduct of
those who appear before them. 59 This power is inherent within the
courts. 60 Thus, along with specific statutes that grant authority, 61

from the attorney’s conduct in the underlying criminal proceedings.”); Coyazo v. State, 897
P.2d 234, 238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing state statutes that “provide complete
immunity from suit”).
54. See Wiley v. Cnty. of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. 1998) (citing cases where
states have required “actual innocence” before filing a malpractice claim).
55. Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 561 (Or. 1993).
56. For example, in the case of In re Warren, 321 F. App’x 369, 370 (5th Cir. 2009),
the court issued sanctions after granting relief on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15(D) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
58. See, e.g., Local Crim. R. N.D. Tex. 57.8(b), http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/
pdf/CRIMRULES.pdf (“A presiding judge, after giving opportunity to show cause to the
contrary, may take any appropriate disciplinary action against a member of the bar for: (1)
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar; (2) failure to comply with any rule or order of this
court . . . .”); D.U. R. Practice Civ. R. 83-1.5.1(b), (stating that the court may initiate
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys accused of a violation of an ethical or professional
standard of conduct.).
59. See United States v. Nolen, 472 F.3d 362, 371 (5th Cir. 2006).
60. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bright, 6 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643–44 (1985) (“It is beyond dispute that a federal court may suspend
or dismiss an attorney as an exercise of the court’s inherent powers.”); accord Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (recognizing the inherent power of the court to
impose sanctions when “neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task”).
61. See RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE §
11:4 (2015 ed.) (“A federal court’s power to sanction also arises out of the legislative grant to
promulgate its own rules.”); see also Waguespack v. Halipoto, 633 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. App.
1982) (“The Rules provide a trial judge with the tools to facilitate the litigation of lawsuits
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courts impose sanctions for various offenses including improper
certification, 62 improper claims and motions, 63 filing frivolous
appeals, 64 and misbehavior, 65 among others. 66 The sanctions
themselves may include forcing the attorney to give up the fee he
received to represent the client, 67 imposing restitution, 68 limiting the
attorney’s practice, 69 or requiring the attorney to take remedial
classes on how to be an effective attorney. 70 But in practice, rarely, if
ever, are attorneys sanctioned after being found constitutionally
deficient. 71 In fact, in one study over five years in Utah, the courts
did not sanction a single attorney who had been found ineffective
under the Sixth Amendment. 72
and, to a certain extent, to prevent abuse of the legal process. This discretion is therefore
appropriately broad.”).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (“If a certification violates this rule without substantial
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the
signer, the party on whose behalf the signer was acting, or both. The sanction may include an
order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the violation.”).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). Rule 11(c)(3) also notes that the court may bring these
claims on its own initiative.
64. See United States v. Najera-Gandara, 438 F. App’x 338 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that
filing frivolous appeals “may subject counsel to sanctions”). Courts have also recognized that
sanctions for filing frivolous appeals should only apply in egregious cases so as not to chill the
right to appeal. See Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
65. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (granting a court power to punish by fine or
imprisonment for contempt of its authority, including misbehavior).
66. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A) (violating disclosure rules); FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(d)(2) (failure to comply).
67. For example, in In re Warren, 321 F. App’x 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2009), the court
disbarred counsel and required him to disgorge the $3,500 fee he received to represent
the defendant.
68. UTAH CTS. JUD. COUNCIL R. JUD. ADMIN.
R.
14-603(i)(1),
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/view.html?rule=ch14/06%20Standards%20f
or%20Lawyer%20Sanctions/USB14-603.html.
69. Id. R. 14-603(i)(3).
70. In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 586 (Kan. 2014) (noting how an attorney and the
respondent participated in the attorney diversion program, under Kansas Supreme Court Rule
203(d), for having violated Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (competence)); see also
KAN. SUP. CT. R. 203(d) (allowing courts to enroll incompetent counsel into an Attorney
Diversion Program). “The purpose of the program is to protect the public by improving the
professional competency of, and providing educational, remedial, and rehabilitative programs
for, the members of the bar of Kansas.” Id.
71. See Jonathan H. Adler, When Ineffective Assistance Becomes Malpractice, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 5, 2009, 9:47 AM), http://volokh.com/2009/11/05/when-ineffectiveassistance-becomes-malpractice/ (stating that “it is rare that defense attorneys are sanctioned
for providing inadequate assistance”).
72. See supra note 17.
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In sum, professional reputation, malpractice claims, and court
sanctions are ineffective and unrealistic as remedies because they do
not really affect the ineffective attorney. Thus, an attorney faces no
repercussions for violating his client’s Sixth Amendment rights.
B. The Increase in Successful IAC Claims
The sharp increase in ineffective assistance claims as well as the
increase in constitutionally deficient attorneys further demonstrates
the need for a remedy. Today, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
are the most frequently filed claim in both federal and state postconviction proceedings. 73 And the number of ineffective assistance
claims is rising. 74 As “such claims have become more and more
prevalent, claims about other constitutional deprivations have fallen
by the wayside,” 75 causing scholars to suggest that these claims
predominate because petitioners “perceive[] that courts are receptive
to them.” 76 To be sure, because the bar has been set so low, it is not
difficult for an attorney to meet the Strickland standard. Not
surprisingly then, in relation to how many claims are filed, only a
relative few actually succeed. 77 For example, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming noted that between 1986 and 1993, only three cases were
overturned because of ineffective assistance of counsel. 78 And in
another study of ineffective assistance claims from California, New
York, Texas, and Alabama, it was demonstrated that “although
defendants raised ineffective assistance of counsel in 41% of state
post-conviction petitions in the targeted years of 1990 and 1992,
state courts granted relief in only 8% of the cases.” 79
73. Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1118
(1999). Further, reports have stated that “‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ was the most
frequently cited reason for habeas corpus petitions filed by State inmates.” Id.
74. Tom Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 S.C. L. REV. 425,
433 (2011).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 449.
77. See Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J.
2428, 2431 n.10 (2013) (noting that in a survey of 3,605 federal habeas petitions from 2005
to 2010 in Michigan, only 100 were granted relief, 45 of those were because of ineffective
assistance of counsel and of that 45, 17 of those that had granted relief were overturned on
appeal or, in other words, a success rate of 1.3%).
78. Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 693 n.5 (Wyo. 1993).
79. Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 684 n.23 (2007) (citing Victor E.

1126

RICKS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

1115

3/12/2016 5:22 PM

Raising the Bar

But these numbers are dramatically changing in some states. For
example, in Utah during the seven-year period between 1998 and
2005, there were only a total of two reported cases where the courts
reversed for ineffective assistance. 80 However, in the following sevenyear period between 2006 and 2013, the Utah courts found that an
attorney’s conduct was both prejudicial and constitutionally deficient
in at least fifteen cases. 81 Similarly, in Kansas, in the period between
1984 and 2003, there were only a total of three reported cases
where the courts reversed for ineffective assistance. 82 But in the
following ten-year period between 2004 and 2014, the Kansas
courts found that an attorney’s conduct was both prejudicial and
deficient in at least fourteen cases. 83 One of the most impressive
increases comes from the state of Washington. Between 1982 and
1992, there were only four successful claims of ineffective
assistance. 84 But in the following ten years, between 1993 and 2003,
that number increased to fourteen successful claims. 85 And in the
Flango & Patricia McKenna, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Court Convictions, 31
CAL. W. L. REV. 237, 247 tbl.4, 259 tbl.12 (1995)).
80. See State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 382 (Utah 1999); State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d
1243, 1249 (Utah 2000).
81. See State v. Larrabee, 321 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Utah 2013); Gregg v. State, 279 P.3d
396 (Utah 2012); State v. Moore, 289 P.3d 487 (Utah 2012); State v. Ott, 247 P.3d 344
(Utah 2010); Housekeeper v. State, 197 P.3d 636 (Utah 2008); State v. Eyre, 179 P.3d 792
(Utah 2007); State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321 (Utah 2007); Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480
(Utah 2006); State v. Ekstrom, 316 P.3d 435, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 2013); State v. Charles,
263 P.3d 469 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); State v. Fowers, 265 P.3d 832 (Utah Ct. App. 2011);
State v. Sellers, 248 P.3d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); State v. King, 248 P.3d 984 (Utah Ct.
App. 2010); State v. Moore, 223 P.3d 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 2009); State v. Perez-Avila, 131
P.3d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
82. State v. Washington, 68 P.3d 134 (Kan. 2003); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan.
2000); Mullins v. State, 46 P.3d 1222 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002).
83. Miller v. State, 318 P.3d 155, 164 (Kan. 2014); State v. Brooks, 305 P.3d 634,
636–37 (Kan. 2013); State v. Cheatham, 292 P.3d 318 (Kan. 2013); In re Ontiberos, 287
P.3d 855 (Kan. 2012); Albright v. State, 251 P.3d 52 (Kan. 2011); State v. Stovall, 312 P.3d
1271, 1273 (Kan. 2009); State v. Overstreet, 200 P.3d 427 (Kan. 2009); State v. Hemphill,
186 P.3d 777 (Kan. 2008); State v. Patton, 195 P.3d 753 (Kan. 2008); Laymon v. State, 122
P.3d 326 (Kan. 2005); State v. Davis, 85 P.3d 1164 (Kan. 2004); Wilson v. State, 340 P.3d
1213, 1230 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Shumway v. State, 293 P.3d 772 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013)
King v. State, 154 P.3d 545 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
84. See State v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1987) (en banc); State v. Tarica, 798
P.2d 296 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Carter, 783 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989); Matter
of Frampton, 726 P.2d 486 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
85. See In re Brett, 16 P.3d 601 (Wash. 2001); In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610 (Wash.
2001) (en banc); State v. Aho, 975 P.2d 512 (Wash. 1999); In re Maxfield, 945 P.2d 196
(Wash. 1997) (en banc); State v. Horton, 68 P.3d 1145 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); State v.
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next ten years, between 2004 and 2014, the numbers jumped to
over twenty-nine successful claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. 86 This same pattern is seen in several other states ranging
from California 87 to Alabama. 88
Shaver, 65 P.3d 688 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Lopez, 27 P.3d 237 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001), aff’d on other grounds, 55 P.3d 609 (Wash. 2002); State v. Wicker, 20 P.3d 1007
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001); State v. S.M., 996 P.2d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Klinger,
980 P.2d 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Klinger, 980 P.2d 282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Saunders, 958 P.2d 364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Doogan, 917 P.2d 155 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1996); State v. Stowe, 858 P.2d 267 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
86. See In re Morris, 288 P.3d 1140 (Wash. 2012) (en banc); State v. Cardwell, 257
P.3d 1114 (Wash. 2011); State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015 (Wash. 2011); State v. A.N.J., 225
P.3d 956 (Wash. 2010) (en banc); State v. Kyllo, 215 P.3d 177 (Wash. 2009) (en banc); State
v. Sutherby, 204 P.3d 916 (Wash. 2009) (en banc); State v. Thiefault, 158 P.3d 580 (Wash.
2007) (en banc); In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Dalluge, 100 P.3d 279 (Wash. 2004) (en
banc); In re Davis, 101 P.3d 1 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); In re Orange, 100 P.3d 291 (Wash.
2004) (en banc); State v. Reichenbach, 101 P.3d 80 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); State v. Fedoruk,
339 P.3d 233, 242 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Hamilton, 320 P.3d 142 (Wash. Ct. App.
2014); State v. Hassan, 336 P.3d 99, 105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); In re D’Allesandro, 314
P.3d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Phuong, 299 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); In re
Wilson, 279 P.3d 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Martinez, 253 P.3d 445 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2011); State v. Adamy, 213 P.3d 627 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); In re Pers. Restraint
Petition of Crawford, 209 P.3d 507 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Powell, 206 P.3d 703
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Smith, 223 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); In re
Dependency of G.A.R., 150 P.3d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Hendrickson, 158 P.3d
1257 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 198 P.3d 1029 (Wash. 2009); In re
Hubert, 158 P.3d 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Horton, 146 P.3d 1227 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2006); State v. Meckelson, 135 P.3d 991 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Pittman, 166
P.3d 720 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); State v. Saunders, 86 P.3d 232 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
87. California’s successful ineffective assistance claims increased from six reported cases
between 1993 and 2003 to fourteen reported cases between 2004 and 2014. See In re Hardy,
163 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2007); In re Lucas, 94 P.3d 477 (Cal. 2004); In re Sanders, 981 P.2d
1038 (Cal. 1999); In re Jones, 917 P.2d 1175 (Cal. 1996); In re Neely, 864 P.2d 474 (Cal.
1993); People v. Hussain, 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 686 (Ct. App. 2014); People v. Speight, 174
Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 469 (Ct. App. 2014); In re Brown, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 822, 824 (Ct. App.
2013); People v. Smith, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Ct. App. 2013); In re Hill, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d
856 (Ct. App. 2011); People v. Roberts, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 810 (Ct. App. 2011); People v.
Peyton, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243 (Ct. App. 2009); In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725 (Ct.
App. 2009); People v. Gayton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Le, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 146 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Thimmes, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 925 (Ct. App. 2006);
People v. Callahan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 226 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. Donaldson, 113 Cal.
Rept. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 2001); People v. Burnett, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629 (Ct. App.
1999);People v. Denison, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524 (Ct. App. 1998).
88. In Alabama, successful claims of ineffective assistance of counsel increased from five
between 1993 and 2003, to twelve between 2004 and 2014. See Ex parte Pierce, 851 So. 2d
618 (Ala. 2002); State v. Ziegler, 159 So. 3d 96, 104 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014); Frost v. State,
76 So. 3d 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Stith v. State, 76 So. 3d 286 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011);
State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Smith, 85 So. 3d 1063 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2010); Powers v. State, 38 So. 3d 764 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); McCombs v. State,
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There are several possible reasons for the increase in successful
ineffective assistance claims. A pessimist might say that attorneys are
just getting worse. To be sure, over the years scholars have argued
that often many indigent defendants do not receive effective
assistance. 89 Indeed some scholars have estimated that from onethird to one-half of the lawyers who appear in court are not qualified
to render the assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 90 But
bad lawyering is nothing new and cannot reasonably explain the
large increases over several different states. 91 Other possible reasons
to explain the increase in successful claims may include that courts
are simply misinterpreting Strickland or that new judges are
appointed with more lenient ideas of what makes up Strickland’s
“prevailing professional norms.” But again, the fact that in the past
twenty years the number of successful ineffective assistance claims is
almost universally rising would seem to demonstrate that a newly
appointed judge would not be the only answer. 92
But regardless of the reason, the sharp increase in successful
ineffective assistance claims illustrates the need for society to have
some remedy against the ineffective attorney—more than what
currently exists. With the increase in successful claims and with no
remedy against the deficient attorney, outcomes become less accurate
and society loses confidence in the system. It has been said that the
adversarial system assumes that “the truth can be served best only if
each side is represented by a competent attorney.” 93 But what if one
3 So. 3d 950 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Nickens v. State, 981 So. 2d 1165 (Ala. Crim. App.
2007); Reeves v. State, 974 So. 2d 314 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Hamlet, 913 So. 2d
493 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Bargeron v. State, 895 So. 2d 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Cobb
v. State, 895 So. 2d 1044 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); Strickland v. State, 771 So. 2d 1123 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1999); Grace v. State, 683 So. 2d 17 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Williams,
679 So. 2d 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Walker v. State, 684 So. 2d 170 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996).
89. Primus, supra note 79, at 684 n.23 (citing David L. Bazelon, The Defective
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973) (“[A] great many—if not most—
indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the
6th Amendment.”)).
90. See id. (citing Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized
Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 227, 234 (1973) (stating that “from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in
the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation” and some
judges have even claimed that number is “as high as 75 percent”)).
91. See Burger, supra, note 90 at 234.
92. See supra notes 80–88.
93. Kelly, supra note 42, at 1096.
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side is represented by a terrible and incompetent attorney? Will the
truth really come out? A further issue is that, like the attorney in
Aldrich, 94 there is nothing to stop the attorney from acting
incompetently again. As a result, society loses confidence in
the system.
C. The Problems with No Real Remedy
The problems created by a lack of any repercussions and any real
deterrent include that the State is overburdened with frivolous
claims, outcomes become less reliable because of defense counsel
falling on his sword, and inadequate counsel continues to offer
inadequate assistance.
First, one of the major problems with a lack of repercussion
against the “ineffective” attorney is that there is no deterrent for
filing a frivolous claim against that attorney. Ineffective assistance of
counsel is the most common issue raised in habeas petitions and a
non-habeas appeal is a “very common—if not the most common—
claim for relief.” 95 Yet only a fraction of those claims actually win. 96
The ninety-two percent fail-rate for ineffective assistance claims
illustrates that there are many attorneys filing frivolous claims. 97
A further negative outcome of not having any real repercussions
against the offending attorney comes in the form of defense counsel
“falling on its sword” with no fear of any professional consequences.
Falling on the sword refers to the tactic of trial counsel admitting
and then arguing that they were constitutionally ineffective in order
to have their client receive a new trial. 98 And this tactic is well known
94. See supra Part I.
95. Aaron K. Friess, Soothsaying with a Foggy Crystal Ball: A Critique of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Remedy for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When a Criminal Defendant
Rejects a Plea Bargain [Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012)], 52 WASHBURN L.J. 147,
168 (2012); see also supra notes 34–36.
96. See Primus, supra note 79, at 682 n.13; State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243, 1249
(Utah 2000); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 382 (Utah 1999).
97. See supra note 81.
98. See Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 1995) (“To support
this conclusion, Hendricks cites Berman’s admission at the evidentiary hearing that he would
have presented Dr. Carson’s testimony in the guilt phase if he had done a more thorough
investigation.”); Boyle v. United States, No. 13 Cv. 7958(CM), 2014 WL 1744256, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2014) (“Boyle’s motion is supported by self-critical affidavits from his three
trial attorneys: Marc Fernich, Martin Geduldig and Diarmuid White; each attorney falling on
his sword—claiming that the failure to pursue the statute of limitation defenses was not
strategic, but oversight.”).
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to judges. 99 But even though it has been heavily criticized, 100 there
are still those who support and even encourage this practice. 101 As a
result, because counsel suffers few if any consequences for being
declared ineffective or constitutionally deficient, attorneys may “see
no harm in” 102 or “even see it as their duty” 103 to “fall on
their sword.”
But regardless of whether this is a commendable practice, this
tactic has a negative impact on ineffective assistance jurisprudence by
seriously distorting what in fact makes an attorney “ineffective.” 104 In
other words, counsel who otherwise would be found competent, are
found incompetent because they admit ineffectiveness in order to
help out a client. 105 The effect is that our jurisprudence fills up with
what Judge Kozinski labeled “descriptions of perfectly adequate
performance that is assumed to be deficient.” 106

99. See Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 701 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (describing the act of falling on one’s sword as “something trial counsel are known
to do to help their clients on habeas”), rev’d sub nom. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388
(2011); see also Schmitt v. State, 779 A.2d 1004, 1012 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (criticizing
defense counsel for “falling on his sword” and being “unduly self-abasing”); Becker v. State,
232 P.3d 376, 379 (Mont. 2010) (Nelson, J. concurring) (“Appellate counsel’s gratuitously
falling on his sword is self-serving . . . .”); Commonwealth v. McSharry, 942 N.E.2d 1018
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (describing counsel’s affidavit admitting ineffective assistance as “falling
on his sword”); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1276 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
remedies for counsel who “in falling on his sword, had admitted he was ineffective”).
100. Gideon, The Sword: Fall on It, PUB. DEFENDER, (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:29 PM)
http://apublicdefender.com/2010/10/05/the-sword-fall-on-it/
(advocating
defense
attorneys to admit ineffective assistance in order “to assist our clients in any way possible and
to remedy any constitutional violation that occurs due to our mishandling of a case”).
101. See Fox, supra note 47, at 1192 (encouraging defense counsel to admit
wrongdoing “particularly when a recognition of one’s failings may not only make one a better
lawyer next time around but provide one’s former client with an opportunity to escape a date
with the executioner”); see also Jeff Gamso, Especially When It’s Hard: Falling on One’s Sword,
GAMSO – FOR DEF., (July 16, 2014, 12:15 AM), http://gamso-forthedefense.blogspot.com/
2014/07/especially-when-its-hard-falling-on.html (advocating that defense attorneys should
“[f]all on their sword” and “fess up” when they have done “a terrible job”).
102. Pinholster, 590 F.3d at 701 n.10.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 42, at 1089, 1092 (“In some of these cases, the
defendant’s trial or appellate counsel will furnish an affidavit essentially admitting the
allegations, and equally disconcerting is the fact that the allegations, if true, reflect lawyering
totally devoid of that high sense of public service described by Dean Pound” when he
described the practice of law as “the pursuit of a learned art, a common calling in the spirit of
public service, no less a public service because it is incidentally the means of a livelihood.”).
106. Pinholster, 590 F.3d at 701 n.10.
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A final problem with the lack of repercussions is that counsel may
continue to represent future defendants and continue to give less
than effective assistance to those defendants. As Justice Maura D.
Corrigan from Michigan stated, “[T]o protect future defendants, it
is important . . . to identify attorneys who may consistently provide
ineffective assistance, in order to take any appropriate disciplinary
action.” 107 Yet without any real remedy against the incompetent
counsel, the attorneys, judges, and especially the general public are
not really aware of the offending attorney’s conduct. Thus the
“ineffective” attorney will likely represent other clients. And he may
very well give the same quality of assistance that he previously gave.
D. Why Are There No Repercussions from the State Bar?
But why are there no repercussions from the state bar against an
attorney who has “made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment”? 108 There are several possible answers. Among those
are: (1) the difficulty in creating a one-size-fits-all solution, (2) the
fear of ruining collegial relationships, and (3) simply a weak and
underfunded state bar. But each of these explanations fails.
Ultimately, there are no repercussions from the state bar because no
one reports ineffective attorneys.
First, one possible reason that there currently are no
repercussions from the state bar associations is the difficulty of a onesize-fits-all solution. There are many different types of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Thus, there may be a difference between what
has been called “personal ineffectiveness” and “structural
ineffectiveness.” 109 For example, there are the attorneys who fall
asleep during trial, 110 are under the influence of alcohol or drugs
while representing a client, 111 or “are out in the courthouse parking
lot while key prosecution witnesses testify.” 112 On the other hand,
107. People v. Henderson, 776 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan,
J., concurring).
108. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
109. Primus, supra note 79, at 686.
110. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 372 (5th Cir. 2001).
111. Gershman, supra note 41 at 560 (“A lawyer who is drunk or sleeping during a trial
may be unable to render effective advocacy.”).
112. Primus, supra note 79, at 686 (discussing many instances where defendants have
claimed ineffective assistance).
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there may be ineffective assistance that comes as a direct result of
public defender offices that are simply overworked and
understaffed. 113 The argument is that because of the huge caseloads,
there simply is not enough time to give the attention and effort that
is necessary to provide the minimal assistance required by the
Constitution. And in recognition of these “structural” problems,
courts and legislatures simply turn a blind eye to such problems.
To be sure, because of these differences, state bars may find it
difficult to create a blanket one-size-fits-all solution to the problem.
Neither sanctions, discipline, nor other repercussions may be
appropriate in every case. But the one-size-fits-all approach has its
advantages. Whether the attorney fell asleep during trial or was
simply overworked, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights have
been violated. And in both cases, an attorney has acted so
incompetently so as to violate that right.
A second possible reason that there are no real repercussions
from the state bar against an ineffective attorney is that attorneys and
judges may feel that if they report another attorney, it would
interfere with their professional relationships. As one scholar noted,
“Lawyers may fear being considered a tattletale by their peers within
the legal community.” 114 Of course there may be the occasional
attorney who would be happy to report certain defense attorneys,
but because in many respects lawyers depend on their reputation
within the community and among members of the bar, the potential
negative effects of “being labeled a snitch” could cause many
problems in their professional lives. 115 These problems may include
collateral effects in subsequent cases that involve the “ineffective”
attorney. If one attorney has reported another, it is possible, and
even likely, that the reported attorney would feel hostile towards
the other.

113. See Indigent Defense, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (Dec. 2011),
http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_indigentdefense.html (citing a study that found
that in 2007, 964 public defender offices nationwide received nearly 6 million indigent defense
cases); see also Voigts, supra note 73, at 1119 (“Court-appointed lawyers are often underexperienced and over-burdened, and frequently the measures courts have adopted to address
both those problems have not been particularly successful.”).
114. Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It
Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 752 (2003).
115. Id. at 753; see also Primus, supra note 79, at 732 (“Whatever the reason, members
of the Bar seldom report instances of attorney misconduct.”).

1133

RICKS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/12/2016 5:22 PM

2015

But while reporting might carry some social and professional
costs, and even may be uncomfortable to do, “the benefits of
reporting may often outweigh the costs.” 116 Reporting ineffective
attorneys would raise the bar for what is a “reasonable” attorney.
And assuming the bar did anything after the attorney was reported,
it would deter attorneys who have been found ineffective from
continuing to give sub-par assistance to yet another defendant.
Further, it would increase the public’s faith in other attorneys and
the system itself.
The third and most viable reason that there may not be any
current repercussions against the offending attorney is the inherent
weaknesses of state bar associations in regulating attorney conduct.
In fact, over the years there have been many critics of the state bar’s
capacity to prosecute potential rule violations. 117 And although
attorneys are required to “conform their behavior to these state
codes,” 118 one commentator has noted the following:
[S]tudy after study has shown that the current rules of professional
conduct are not enforced. Misconduct is rarely perceived. If
perceived, it is not reported. If reported, it is not investigated. If
investigated, violations are not found. If found, they are excused. If
they are not excused, penalties are light. And if significant penalties
are imposed, the lawyer soon returns to practice, in that state
or another. 119

However, at least in theory, a criminal defense attorney’s actions
and violation of state rules could lead to disciplinary action and
proceedings to address the alleged misconduct. 120 In reality, it does
not happen. 121 But it is unfortunate that it does not happen. The

116. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 285 (2003).
117. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639, 649 (1981) (“Lawyers can hardly present their travesty of a penal system as an
effective deterrent.”).
118. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and
Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 154 (2009).
119. Abel, supra note 117, at 648–49 (footnotes omitted).
120. Roberts, supra note 118, at 154 (discussing potential sanctions for alleged
misconduct including sanctions “ranging from ‘no action,’ to private reprimand,
to disbarment”).
121. Utah State Bar, supra note 17, para. 16 (“The Utah Bar Journal publishes a
monthly summary of all attorneys who have been professionally disciplined. I have reviewed
those summaries for the past five years and cannot find a single instance in which a criminal
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state bar associations seem the ideal place to begin ensuring
competence among lawyers. State bars already have established rules
and guidelines for attorney conduct. State bars already have
established means for enforcing those guidelines. And state bar
associations are already accessible to anyone—anyone can file a
claim. 122 In fact, state bar associations have even been labeled as “the
most easily accessible means by which criminal defendants can begin
to be protected against bad lawyering.” 123 And while some critics
have stated that “state bar associations seem loathe to recommend
any meaningful sanction,” 124 state bar associations impose over 5,600
sanctions annually. 125 But if so many sanctions are imposed each year,
how is it that the bar association could be perceived as weak? And
why would ineffective attorneys not be sanctioned?
One of the major weaknesses of state bars is that the disciplinary
boards generally rely on complaints before taking action. 126 Seldom
do state bars initiate independent investigations. 127 Further,
defendants file relatively few complaints against trial attorneys in

defense lawyer was sanctioned because a court had concluded that he was ineffective under the
Sixth Amendment.”).
122. See Office of Professional Conduct Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH ST. B.,
http://www.utahbar.org/opc/office-of-professional-conduct-frequently-asked-questions/
(last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (complaints may be filed by a member of the public or by the
Bar itself).
123. Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A
System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 43 (2002).
124. Roberts, supra note 118, at 154–55.
125. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1 (2007). While the number of complaints alleged against the 1.3 million lawyers in
the United States far outnumbers the amount where the state bars actually impose sanctions,
the fact that many thousands are sanctioned each year illustrates that the bar is not
totally defunct.
126. David L. Dranoff, Attorney Professional Responsibility: Competence Through
Malpractice Liability, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 633, 647 (1982) (“[B]oards generally refuse to
conduct independent investigations, and instead rely almost exclusively on complaints as a basis
for action. Because the boards take a passive role, the system is dependent on the existence of
incentives for outside parties to file complaints.”) (footnote omitted).
127. Id.
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criminal cases. 128 And even fewer judges and lawyers
file complaints. 129
The solution, therefore, rests on establishing a vehicle by which
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can be reported
and corrected.
IV. A VIOLATION OF A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE IS A VIOLATION OF A LAWYER’S DUTY UNDER THE
PROFESSIONAL RULES TO PROVIDE COMPETENT ASSISTANCE.
The vehicle by which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
can be reported and corrected comes from the inherent relationship
between the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct and a defendant’s
right to effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment. Because of
that relationship, a violation of Strickland implies a violation of the
Professional Rules. The idea that there is a link between the two is
not difficult to see. Nor is the idea novel. In fact, in 1986 even the
Supreme Court recognized the increasing need to rely on this
relationship and the potential need to rely more on these standards.
The Supreme Court stated that in “some future case . . . we may
need to define with greater precision the weight to be given to
recognized canons of ethics, the standards established by the state in
statutes or professional codes, and the Sixth Amendment, in defining
the proper scope and limits on that conduct.” 130 And since that date,
many courts began to define the scope and limits of effective
assistance by looking to the canons of ethics and the
professional codes. 131

128. Primus, supra note 79, at 700 (“[V]ery few complaints get filed against trial
attorneys in criminal cases. Judges and other lawyers rarely file complaints, and criminal
defendants have little incentive to file them, particularly given that defendants are not
compensated for lodging complaints.”) (footnote omitted).
129. See id.; Dranoff, supra note 126, at 669 n.79 (“A Michigan study indicated that
members of the legal profession filed 8.1% of complaints and that only 1.8% were filed by
lawyers who were not involved in some sort of professional relationship with
the respondent.”).
130. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165–66 (1986).
131. See infra Section IV.A; see also Ramseyer ex rel. Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F. Supp.
1239, 1254 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Ramseyer ex rel. Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432
(9th Cir. 1995) (noting that ABA standards “are regularly used by courts as guidelines in
determining
whether
an
attorney’s
performance
falls
below
reasonable
professional standards”).
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This inherent link between the ABA standards and Strickland
demonstrates that a violation of the defendant’s right to effective
assistance is also a violation of the professional rules to provide
competent assistance. This Part will first discuss how over the years
the ABA Standards have come to define Strickland’s “prevailing
professional norms.” Following that discussion, it will examine the
idea that because of the inherent link and because so many courts
rely on the ABA standards, a violation of a constitutional right
necessarily implies a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Finally, this Part will explore how the link between the ABA
standards and Strickland’s “professional norms” has been applied to
cases outside the Sixth Amendment. These cases will further enforce
that a violation of Strickland violates the Rules sufficiently for the
attorney to be reported to the state bar.
A. The ABA Standards Help Define Strickland’s “Professional Norms”
The Supreme Court has “long . . . recognized that ‘[p]revailing
norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards
and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable.’” 132
Thus, because they “reflect the . . . norms of the legal profession,” 133
the ABA standards “act as guides in determining the reasonableness
of counsel’s assistance.” 134 And these standards are frequently cited
by courts in determining whether counsel’s representation was
objectively unreasonable. 135 Thus, “the use of ethical standards to
illuminate whether a lawyer has provided ineffective assistance is not
novel or overreaching, but well established.” 136

132. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (citing Bobby v. Van Hook, 558
U.S. 4, 7 (2009) (per curiam); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191 & n.6 (2004); Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)).
133. State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 495 (Iowa 2012).
134. Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 960 (1984); see also State v. Vance, 790
N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 2010) (“The Supreme Court indicates the American Bar Association
standards and like documents reflect the prevailing norms of practice.”); Missouri v. Frye, 132
S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“Though the standard for counsel’s performance is not determined
solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these standards can be
important guides.”).
135. See Paul V. Vapnek et al., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Ch. 6-G (2015); Harris, 853 F. Supp. at 1254 (“These standards are
regularly used by courts as guidelines in determining whether an attorney’s performance falls
below reasonable professional standards.”).
136. Clay, 824 N.W.2d at 502.
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For example, courts have used the ABA standards to evaluate
counsel’s “duty to investigate” 137 and to determine whether counsel’s
“pretrial investigation and preparation” was sufficient. 138 Courts have
used the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in determining
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel
regarding
“multiple
representation,” 139 zealous representation, 140 false statements, 141 and
whether counsel was obligated to challenge the search of a vehicle. 142
Moreover, courts have often considered and invoked these
ethical standards “recognizing that fidelity to those standards
implicates not only the interests of the defendants, but the credibility
of the system, its integrity, and the institutional interests in the
rendition of just verdicts.” 143 These standards and professional norms
“illuminate” the question of whether a lawyer has provided effective
assistance. 144 And using these guidelines, standards, and rules has the
positive effect of “draw[ing] lawyers attention to specific duties and
tasks which are integral to effective representation.” 145
B. A Violation of Strickland Implies a Violation of the Rules
Because so many courts have looked to the ABA’s standards to
determine the “professional norms” relevant to ineffective assistance
claims, when an attorney is found ineffective under Strickland, it
necessarily implies a violation of the Model Rules. The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which every state has adopted in one
form or another specifically state that “[a] lawyer shall provide
137. Smith, 539 U.S. at 522.
138. People v. Jones, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 745, 761 (Ct. App. 2010).
139. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988).
140. People v. Cropper, 152 Cal. Rptr. 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1979).
141. In re Seelig, 850 A.2d 477, 490 (N.J. 2004) (“The Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel does not include the right to cooperation in
the commission of perjury in violation of the ethical standards established by states to govern
attorney conduct.”).
142. State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 786 (Iowa 2010) (“In our own analysis of
whether counsel was ineffective, we have relied on our Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers to measure counsel’s performance.”).
143. People v. DeFreitas, 630 N.Y.S.2d 755, 759 (App. Div. 1995).
144. State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 502 (Iowa 2012).
145. See Roberts, supra note 118, at 161 n.174 (quoting John H. Blume & Stacey D.
Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over Again”: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith and
Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 159 (2007)).
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competent representation to a client.” 146 And “competent
representation” requires that an attorney act with “the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.” 147 Or, in other words, competent
representation means that an attorney will act with at least the
minimal ability of a reasonable practitioner. 148 The official comments
further clarify that “competent handling” of a matter includes
analysis of the factual and legal elements of an issue, sufficient
preparation, and use of methods and procedures that meet the
standards of other competent practitioners. 149
Based on the same language of ABA Rule 1.1, courts have
determined in disciplinary hearings that attorneys were not
competent for repeatedly filing and then dismissing cases when
responses were due, 150 “failing to address a potential bar to any
patent in a patentability opinion,” 151 failing to consult with a client
and inform him of a plea agreement, 152 filing frivolous claims, 153
failing to examine title or record documents, 154 failing to obtain
training to defend a capital murder case, 155 failing to conduct a
thorough investigation of the facts, 156 failing to investigate alibi
witnesses, 157 failing to submit a judgment of default to the court for
several months, 158 failing to file an appropriate and sufficient postconviction petition, 159 failing to examine the physical evidence, 160
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
147. Id.
148. Id. cmt. [5]. While the official comments are not authoritative, they do offer
additional insight into the intent of the drafts of the Model Rules.
149. Id.
150. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Young, 175 P.3d 371, 377 (Okla. 2007).
151. In re Discipline of Peirce, 128 P.3d 443, 445 (Nev. 2006), reinstatement granted
sub nom. In re Reinstatement of Peirce, No. 62091, 2014 WL 4804214 (Nev. Sept. 24, 2014).
152. In re Disciplinary Action against Wolff, 810 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2012).
153. Id.
154. In re Boyce, 613 S.E.2d 538, 539–40 (S.C. 2005).
155. In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 577 (Kan. 2014). The attorney was also incompetent
for various other reasons, including that the attorney told the jury that they ought to execute
the killer. See id. at 578.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Baker v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 935 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1996).
159. In re Bash, 880 N.E.2d 1182, 1183 (Ind. 2008). The court further stated that this
was “because of his lack of understanding of fundamental requirements for obtaining postconviction relief. As a result, his client may have lost a potentially meritorious challenge to his
confinement conviction.” Id. at 1184.
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failing to interview witnesses who may have been helpful to the
defense, 161 and failing to produce evidence that would have reduced
a sentence. 162
Just as the Professional Rules define competence in terms of
what is “reasonable” representation, so too Strickland defines
“competent assistance” as “reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.” 163 And “reasonableness” under Strickland
means that an attorney cannot be ineffective unless the court finds
that no other attorney would have made the same tactical decisions
at trial or on appeal. 164 Further, Strickland’s “prevailing professional
norms” are guided by the Professional Rules themselves. 165 Thus,
even though the Professional Rules are “guides, and not inexorable
commands,” 166 when an attorney has acted in such a manner that no
other attorney would act, and the court has determined that the
attorney has fallen below the “prevailing professional norms,” he has
necessarily failed to act with “the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.” 167 In other words, when an attorney has violated
Strickland, he has also violated the Model Rules’ standard of
competence. That being said, one scholar has noted that “ethical
violations and ineffective assistance of counsel are not usually seen as
one and the same.” 168 But because courts have consistently used the
ABA Guidelines and Rules of Professional Responsibility in
establishing what in fact makes an attorney ineffective, when a court
160. In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 96 (Ariz. 1993). The attorney also failed to interview
witnesses, read the transcript of the grand jury proceeding that resulted in his client’s
indictment, interview prospective witnesses disclosed in the police reports, consult with his
client on whether the case should go to the jury on lesser included offenses, and challenge
venire persons who stated that they would be uncomfortable sitting as a juror in a child abuse
case. Id.
161. Matter of Murray, 709 P.2d 530, 532 (Ariz. 1985).
162. In re Pankowski, 947 A.2d 1122 (Del. 2007), reinstatement granted, 956 A.2d 642
(Del. 2008). Counsel also failed to meet with the defendant before filing the motion and did
not investigate the defendant’s medical condition. Id.
163. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (emphasis added).
164. See, e.g., Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th Cir.
2011) (“An attorney’s actions are sound trial strategy, and thus effective, if a reasonable
attorney could have taken the same actions.”).
165. See supra, Section IV.A.
166. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (internal citation omitted).
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1.
168. Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self, Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 356 (2009).
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finds an attorney so incompetent so as to violate his client’s Sixth
Amendment rights, the court has also necessarily determined that
the attorney has violated his duties under the Professional Rules.
However, the relationship or link between constitutionally
effective assistance and the Professional Rules does not necessarily go
both ways. 169 Just because an individual has violated an ethical rule
does not necessarily mean he has violated the right to effective
counsel. For example, in Smith v. State an attorney had been
suspended for failing to pay his bar dues but had still represented a
defendant, thus subjecting the attorney to professional discipline. 170
On appeal the defendant claimed that because his attorney had
violated a Rule of Professional Conduct, he was constitutionally
ineffective. 171 But the court held that a violation of a Professional
Rule was not a per se violation of the defendant’s right to counsel. 172
What was important was whether the “representation was sufficiently
incompetent to violate the client’s right to effective assistance
of counsel.” 173
Thus, it is possible to violate a professional rule without raising a
question of ineffective assistance of counsel. But that does not
change the fact that a violation of a client’s Sixth Amendment right
would be a violation of the Rules. To be sure, the Supreme Court
has also stated that “the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation.” 174 But as one scholar has stated, “[w]hile the Sixth
Amendment may not have been designed to improve the quality of
legal representation, neither should it serve to lessen the quality of
that representation.” 175 Thus, even though there may be some
differences between the Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness and the

169. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[B]reach of an ethical standard
does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance
of counsel.”).
170. Smith v. State, 243 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. App. 2007).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 725.
174. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“Moreover, the purpose of
the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal
representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”).
175. Kelly, supra note 42, at 1093.
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Professional Rules, it would be naïve to think that the former does
not impact the latter. 176
Certainly, there are some differences between competence as
defined by Strickland and competence under the Professional Rules.
For example, while a violation of the Professional Rules is a claim
against the attorney, an ineffective assistance claim is technically
against the State. 177 Even though ineffective assistance claims may
rise on direct appeal or in a collateral attack based on a state or
federal statute, in both cases the parties are the government and the
defendant—not the defendant and his prior “ineffective” counsel. 178
Thus, what a defendant is alleging when he raises an ineffective
assistance claim is that the government unconstitutionally convicted
him because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Constitution. 179 Because an ineffective assistance
claim is not technically a claim against the defendant’s attorney, there
are procedural differences that arise. For example, a lawyer has a
right to participate in his own disciplinary counsel, whereas he does
not necessarily have that right in an ineffective assistance claim.180
Therefore, under a claim arising out of a violation of the Professional
Rules, the attorney has the right to defend himself, whereas that is
not necessarily the case in an ineffective assistance claim.
But all that is required for a judge to report an attorney to a state
bar association is knowledge that the attorney has violated a
Professional Rule. 181 Thus, even though there may be differences that
might impact the nature of a disciplinary sanction, the differences do
not change whether or not a judge has sufficient knowledge to
report an attorney for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.
A further difference between the Rules and a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is that in some states the standard of
proof at a disciplinary counsel may be higher and mitigating factors

176. Id.
177. Ramirez v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.R.I. 1998), aff’d, 187 F.3d
622 (1st Cir. 1999) (“It is the government, not the defense attorney, who suffers adverse
consequences when a defendant’s conviction is vacated due to ‘ineffective assistance.’”).
178. Utah State Bar, supra note 17; see also Henak, supra note 168, at 371 (stating that
the “former lawyer is only a witness, and witnesses do not really ‘belong’ to any one particular
party or side of a case”).
179. Utah State Bar, supra note 17.
180. In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 105 (Ariz. 1993).
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3.
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may exist and be taken into account. 182 For example, in Arizona the
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a
constitutional defect has occurred and then the state has the burden
of proving that the defect was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 183 But Arizona’s grounds for discipline require bar counsel to
establish allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 184 Other states
are similar. 185 But again, neither of these differences impacts whether
or not the judge has knowledge sufficient to report an attorney. As
Justice Martone from the Arizona Supreme Court has stated, “[T]he
conduct which results in a denial of effective assistance of counsel
necessarily implicates a denial of competent representation.” 186 In
other words, even though there may be mitigating factors, and even
though the standard of proof may be different, those factors do not
impact whether a judge has knowledge that a violation has occurred,
only the extent of the sanction imposed. 187
In sum, because of the relationship between the Model Rules
and Strickland, when an attorney violates his client’s Sixth
Amendment right, he also has sufficiently violated the Professional
Rules for a court to have the duty to report the attorney.

182. See infra notes 183−85
183. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.8(c).
184. Wolfram, 847 P.2d at 98 n.4.
185. See, e.g., In re Collins, 288 P.3d 847, 854 (Kan. 2012) (“Attorney misconduct must
be established by clear and convincing evidence.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Zimmerman,
276 P.3d 1022, 1027 (Okla. 2012) (“Before discipline is imposed, misconduct must be
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.”); Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 916 So. 2d 647, 651
(Fla. 2005) (“Given this fact, we agree with the Bar that the appropriate standard of proof is
that which is applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings in general, clear and convincing
evidence.”); In re Discipline of Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1075 (Nev. 2008) (“[T]o support a
rule violation, clear and convincing evidence must support a finding . . . .”). But see Ky. Bar
Ass’n v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245, 262 (Ky. 2006) (“[T]he burden of proof shall rest upon the
Association in a disciplinary proceeding, and the facts must be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.”) (citation omitted); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 48 A.3d 1231,
1236 (Pa. 2012) (“In attorney disciplinary proceedings, the [Office of Disciplinary Counsel]
bears the burden of establishing attorney misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
186. Wolfram, 847 P.2d at 106.
187. For example, see UTAH COURTS. Judicial Council Rules Judicial Administration
Rule 14-607, https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/view.html?rule=ch14/06%20
Standards%20for%20Lawyer%20Sanctions/USB14-607.html, which states that “[a]fter
misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered
and weighed in deciding what sanction to impose.” But again, those mitigating factors are
considered after the court has determined that a violation has occurred.
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C. Ineffective Assistance and Asylum
Moreover, this type of connection between a constitutional right
violation as a result of counsel’s ineffectiveness and the Professional
Rules has already been applied in other similar cases. Take, for
example, the case of asylum. Granted, it is important to note at the
outset of this discussion that an ineffective assistance claim for
asylum arises not out of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but
out of the “due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.” 188 But
the requirements to establish ineffective assistance under the Fifth
Amendment are remarkably similar to those of the Sixth
Amendment. 189 Thus it is very instructive of how Sixth Amendment
violations should be applied.
Similar to a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim, where
the defendant is claiming that his attorney was so terrible that he
deprived his client of a fair trial, 190 when an alien files an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under the Fifth Amendment, he is
claiming that “the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the
alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” 191 And
similar to a Strickland claim, the petitioner must show (1) “that
counsel failed to perform with sufficient competence,” and (2) “that
she was prejudiced by counsel’s performance.” 192 But unlike a
Strickland claim, before an alien is allowed to file an ineffective
assistance claim, he or she is expected to comply with several
procedural guidelines.

188. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that
“[a]lthough there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a deportation proceeding, the
due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment ‘still must be afforded to an alien petitioner.’”
(quoting Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2004))).
189. Compare Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that to
establish ineffective assistance under the Fifth Amendment petitioners must (1) “demonstrate
that counsel [failed to] perform with sufficient competence” and (2) “show that they were
prejudiced by their counsel’s performance”) (internal citation omitted), with Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The prejudice prong of the Fifth Amendment right is
slightly different than Strickland’s in that under the Fifth Amendment all that has been
required is that the “performance of counsel was so inadequate that it may have affected the
outcome of the proceedings.” Ortiz v. I.N.S., 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added).
190. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 385 (2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 686).
191. Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 793 (citation omitted).
192. Id.
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First, the alien must submit an affidavit that includes and explains
“the agreement that was entered into with former counsel.” 193
Second, “former counsel must be informed of the allegations and
allowed the opportunity to respond.” 194 And finally, “the motion
should reflect whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate
disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if not,
why not.” 195 If an individual fails these procedural requirements, the
proceedings may be dismissed. 196
In sum, the implication of these requirements is that there
cannot be ineffective assistance in the constitutional sense unless
there is also incompetence in the ABA sense. Thus, by adopting 197
and approving 198 the requirement to file a complaint with the
appropriate disciplinary authorities every time a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is raised, both courts and administrative
agencies are recognizing the important and inherent link between
the ABA standards and constitutionally effective assistance.
What is interesting about these requirements is not just that the
requirements exist, but also their reasoning. Citing Lozada, the Sixth
Circuit stated:
The requirement that disciplinary authorities be notified of
breaches of professional conduct not only serves to deter meritless
claims of ineffective representation but also highlights the standards
which should be expected of attorneys who represent persons in

193. Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled by Compean, 25 I. &
N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (2015); Debeatham v. Holder, 602 F.3d
481, 484 (2d Cir. 2010). It is important to note that not all circuits have required exact
compliance with these rules. See Castillo-Perez v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[F]ailure to comply with Lozada requirements is not necessarily fatal to a motion to
reopen.”); Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may “go forward when there is substantial compliance
with Lozada such that the purpose of Lozada is ‘fully served by other means.’”) (citation
omitted). But see Henton v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 520 F. App’x 801, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We
have held that all three of Lozada’s procedural requirements must be satisfied.”).
194. Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639.
195. Id.
196. See Henton, 520 F. App’x at 804; Pepaj v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 725, 727 (6th Cir.
2007) (“An alien who fails to comply with Lozada’s requirements forfeits her ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim.”).
197. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iii).
198. Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2 (stating that courts have “acknowledged that the
Lozada framework had largely stood the test of time, having been expressly reaffirmed by the
Board 15 years after its initial adoption”) (internal citation omitted).
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immigration proceedings, the outcome of which may, and often
does, have enormous significance for the person. 199

And if there is “enormous significance” for asylum, which
demands a duty to report the attorney, is there not also “enormous
significance” in a capital case? Or when an individual faces life in
prison? When an individual’s freedom is at stake, as is the case in a
criminal prosecution, surely that creates the possibility of
consequences that are enormously significant to the defendant. In
addition, if the purpose of the Lozada requirements are to “deter
meritless claims,” how much more important would a similar
requirement be in criminal cases. Ineffective assistance is the most
raised claim, 200 yet only a fraction of those claims are deemed
meritorious by the courts. 201 That would indicate many, many
meritless claims.
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND
THE MODEL RULES CREATES THE SOLUTION—
MANDATORY REPORTING
This recognized link between the Professional Rules and
constitutionally ineffective assistance creates the needed remedy—
make it mandatory for judges to report an attorney to the bar when
a counsel has been found ineffective. This would correct the many
problems created by the current lack of any remedy against the
ineffective counsel. 202
Because of the self-regulating nature of the legal profession, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct already require an attorney to
report another attorney for a violation of those Rules. 203 And judges
have a similar duty to report violations. Specifically, when a judge has
knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, the judge is required to report that
attorney. 204 Even if a judge receives information that indicates a
substantial likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

1146

Pepaj, 509 F.3d at 727 (quoting Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639–40).
Supra notes 75–79.
Supra notes 75–79.
Supra Part II.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15.

RICKS.AA (DO NOT DELETE)

1115

3/12/2016 5:22 PM

Raising the Bar

Rules, he is required to take “appropriate action” against that
attorney. 205
Yet no one seems to be taking upon himself or herself to report
attorneys who have violated a client’s constitutional Rights. As one
scholar noted, “It seems that trial judges and opposing counsel may
be ignoring the fact that incompetence is unethical and judge and
lawyer alike are equally culpable for not taking steps to report the
particular practitioner.” 206 Thus, the solution is simply to require
judges and attorneys to report the deficient attorney after he is found
ineffective. To be sure, the Rules state that the reporting
requirement is only applied when an attorney has committed a
violation that raises a “substantial question as to that lawyer’s . . .
fitness as a lawyer.” 207 But the official comments clarify that the term
“substantial” refers to “the seriousness of the possible offense.” 208
And the more serious the offense, the more reason to report
the violation. 209
Now, when an attorney violates a client’s Sixth Amendment right
under Strickland, it is because the court has determined that he has
fallen far below any objective level of reasonableness. 210 In fact, in
order for there to be ineffective assistance, the attorney must have
“made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” 211 It
follows logically that if counsel has been so deficient to not be
functioning as counsel, of course a substantial question arises as to
the lawyer’s fitness.
I am not suggesting a scheme similar to asylum, 212 where once a
claim of ineffective assistance is raised the petitioner is required to
205. Id.
206. Kelly, supra note 42, at 1094–95 (“Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the judge and the lawyer have a duty to inform
the appropriate professional disciplinary authority when either knows that a practitioner is not
fit to practice. All of us must be cognizant of our professional duty to assist in and improve the
legal system.”) (footnote omitted).
207. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r 8.3.
208. Id. cmt. 3.
209. Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 539 (1986) (“The
more serious the violation, the more likely it is that people will universally agree that there is a
moral duty to report it.”).
210. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
211. State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687).
212. Supra Section III.C.
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report the deficient attorney to the bar, but I am suggesting that
after the attorney is actually found ineffective, he should be reported.
This could be accomplished by simply requiring the court to instruct
the clerk to send a copy of the order to the state bar every time the
judge finds an attorney ineffective. Because of the relatively low
number of ineffective assistance claims that actually win, this would
not be a huge burden on any state bar association. But it would
show to both the bar as well as to those claiming ineffective
assistance the seriousness of their claim—that the attorney was so
incompetent that he was not functioning as counsel.
And if attorneys and judges really understood the seriousness of
the claim that they were raising as well as the possible negative
consequences against the alleged ineffective attorney, that in turn
would have many positive impacts on the judicial system. It would
reduce frivolous claims. It would deter attorneys from “falling on
their sword.” And it would deter ineffective attorneys from
continuing to give terrible assistance. 213 In sum, reporting ineffective
attorneys would increase society’s faith in the judicial system.
VI. CONCLUSION—RAISING THE BAR
It has been stated that “[a]ttorney competence directly affects
the fairness of our criminal proceedings.” 214 But a system that fails to
impose any real repercussions on the attorney who is so ineffective
that he is no longer acting as counsel permits society to lose faith in
the judicial system itself. However, because of the inherent link
between competence, as defined by the ABA Rules, and Strickland,
simply requiring judges to report constitutionally ineffective
attorneys after finding them ineffective presents a workable remedy.

213. See People v. Henderson, 776 N.W.2d 906, 907 (Mich. 2010) (Corrigan, J.,
concurring) (“Further, referral to the AGC in these cases avoids encouraging attorneys to use
this Court to correct for their own ineffective representation at the Court of Appeals.”).
214. In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 591 (Kan. 2014).
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Doing so will provide an immediate, positive impact on the
system. Ineffective attorneys would either improve or be removed,
defendants would be more likely to receive a fair trial, and the
general level of skill and competence of practicing attorneys would
increase. As a result, the low Strickland bar may very well rise.
Joseph H. Ricks*

* J.D., April 2015, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. The author
would like to thank Daniel McConkie and Ryan Tenney for their assistance with this article.
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